This is the second and final instalment of my policy paper on the withdrawal from Iraq. The first, with introductory remarks, can be found here.
Withdrawal from Iraq
an in-depth study
Part 3 - Background and Politics
• 3.1. The History of US Policy in this Area
• 3.2. The Key Actors - Politics at Home
• 3.3. How should this Policy be Adopted?
• 3.3. Obstacles
Part 3 – Background and Politics
3.1. The History of US Policy in this Area
The history of US foreign policy towards Iraq starts in earnest in 1963, although their involvement in the Middle East is of an earlier date. Following the end of World War I, and the break up op the Ottoman Empire, US interests in the area grew. A growing American economy needed oil, and the US was allowed a share of the Turkish Petroleum Company (later Iraq PC) (lii). The red line agreement prevented any further expansion in the area until after WW2 at which point Iraq was granted independence by Great Britain. The 1950s saw a gradual weakening of Great Britain in the region, especially following the 1956 Suez Crisis, after which the US had to assume ever more responsibility in the region (liii). The 1953 CIA sponsored coup in Iran was to be the prelude for their eventually taking a more active foreign policy interest in Iraq, for in 1963 a similar operation removed Iraq’s Arab Nationalsit Leader Abdel Karim Kassem and replaced him with the Baath regime (liv). This was to rule Iraq for 40 years, privatize the IPC and skyrocket Saddam Hussein to infamy. Thus intervetionism, albeit partly covert, and countenance of regime change has been central to US policy since the very start.
Foreign policy towards the region focused on creating pillars for regional strategy. Israel was one such since 1967 and Iran was one until 1979. The US supplied the new rulers with information and weapons and corporations like Mobil got major deals in return, expanding US involvement in Iraq (lv). Saddam Hussein’s rise to power came through the Baath Party through an internal coup in 1979 after which foreign policy towards Iraq becomes more important. That same year, Iran overthrew its shah and this was the main catalyst for the greatly expanded cooperation between the US and Saddam in the 1980s. Iran was percieved to be a greater threat to regional stability than Iraq, and in the subsequent Iran-Iraq war US foreign policy was adjusted in order to ensure the containment of Iran. In the following years, Iraq was removed from the State Department’s list of terrorist sponsors which opened up for a flux of funds, intelligence and arms to Iraq. The latter has been controversial in recent years as it was used to develop weapons of chemical, biological and nuclear warfare. The use of poison gas against Kurds in 1988 was made possible by US intelligence, technology and US made helicopters (lvi). Thus, former US policy towards Iraq is to some extent responsible for two of the reasons given for the invasion in 2003; the genocide and the percieved Iraqi capability of producing weapons of mass destruction.
US foreign policy in this period seems to be slightly ad hoc, onesidedly focused on containing Iran and with lacking risk assessment. In addition to the cases above, the US exported technology to Iraq in 1988 which extended the radius of their SCUD missiles, which would enable Iraq to hit Saudi Arabia and Israel during the Gulf War. Also, as international banks cut off loans to Iraq, the US increased their offers and some of this funding was by Saddam directed towards organisations like Hezbollah and Hamas and some towards aquisition of WMD (lvii). On the other side, it was this support coupled with clandestine support for Iran (like the Iran-Contra scandal) which enabled joint Western and US pressure to induce a stalemate and precipitating dual containment of Iran and Iraq. It can easily be concluded from the above cases that although US foreign policy may have seemed sound at the time and achieved their immediate goals, the more far reaching consequences of pre-Gulf War foreign policy towards Iraq was not accounted for and caused many of the serious challenges US foreign policy faced in the early 21st century.
The Gulf War from August 1990 to February 1991 was the first overt aggressive military US activity in Iraq. A response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, it was, in fact, in accord with the Reagan Corollary and a test of the limits of US power in the post-Cold War era (lviii). The US dispatced troops unilaterally before asking for ratification in the UN Security Council, and the lessons learned when this gambit succeded must have influenced the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq unilaterally some 12 years later. In addition, several goals were given for the war; safeguarding oil supplies and Saudi Arabia, ousting the Iraqis from Kuwait and at times even Saddam from power and these bear some semblance to some of the aims given for the 2003 invasion. The difference is that whereas Bush Sr., a staunch believer in US primacy, left Saddam in power from fear of having to rebuild Iraq thus dashing the hopes of many southern shi’as and claiming to have “buried the specter of Vietnam in the desert sands of the Arabian peninsula”, his son inherited his heated legacy in the area, did everything his father did not do and opened the grave of the specter of Vietnam to his cost (lix). However, whereas US foreign policy before and during the Gulf War was conducted with limited public support and minimal legislative involvement domestically and rather off-handedly internationally, it enjoyed a lot more domestic support before and throughout 2003 (lx).
The Clinton era saw the policy of containment, soon to be centered on the dual containment of Iran and Iraq, giving way to the more drastic policy of regime change. This was shown through legislation such as the Iraq Liberation Act and the bombings of Iraq and targets in former Yugoslavia. This was done in combination with a brief “relapse” into multilateralism in order to limit US commitments, although such tendencies of isolationism was generally frowned upon by the political elite. His presidency saw cooperation with the UN in the implementation of economic sanctions against Iraq and UN weapons inspectors, who were to monitor the destruction of WMDs. Meanwhile, the US operated a no-fly zone in Northern Iraq in order to protect the Kurds from further atrocities from their own government. This was, however, not mandated by the UN. During Clinton’s second term he had to struggle with a hostile republican controlled Congress, a control that were not lost until the Iraq war’s toll on public opinion caused a shift in 2006 (lxi).
As US policy in the area is described in detail in chapter 2.2., this chapter will be concluded by two connecting lines through history. The UN inspectors, who before the war argued that their work neither proved nor disproved presence of WMD and therefore were inconclusive as evidence, could conclude that those weapons of biological warfare found after the Gulf War were direct results of technology and biological cultures provided by the US in the 80s (lxii). Furthermore, the Iraqi Perspectives Project, mentioned in chapter 2.2., concluded that whatever actual weaponry found were ineffective leftovers from the Gulf War, arms that were made with US technology and materials (lxiii). These two cases show how US policy in the region can backfire and the importance of thinking ahead. As the discussion in chapter 2.3. showed, this is taken care of as far as possible with concern to this policy recommendation.
3.2. The Key Actors – Politics at Home
This chapter will explore the interests, legal possibilities for action and reactions to this policy. Which actors have interests in and ability to influence this policy and its passing and how might these act? The focus will be on the executive and legislative branch as well as organized interest groups. The reason for the relative exclusion of the judicial branch is that the primary role of the courts in relation to this policy is guarding legislative power over foreign policy and resolving issues with US citizens comitting crimes abroad, and the Judiciary therefore has a somewhat limited influence on the actual policy.
The executive branch
The presidential administration is obviously the most important actor in the implementation of this policy. They retain “the mainline obligation of coordinating and overseeing America's position in the international sphere" (lxiv) and are, as seen in 2.3. the main proponent of this respect. During the sustained emergency of the Cold War, a flow of power was seen towards the president wielding the executive prerogative. This also led to expansion of the executive office (mainly fora like NSC and assisting agencies such as the CIA). Following the end of the Cold War, foreign policy initiation, at least with regard to military action, has continued to flow towards the executive. This may also be due to the nature of the office of President. The President holds the only office which is nationally elected and can therefore count on a wider domestic consensus basis for executive action (lxv).
As mentioned in 2.3., the Department of Defense has issued several statements expressing their support for this policy. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, whose history as Defense Secretary in the second Bush administration renders him an authority on this field, did, together with Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, present the President with a number of possible withdrawal plans in February (lxx). The Defense Secretary has also made statements following the Camp Lejeune speech in support of the withdrawal (lxi). The Department of Defense is therefore one of the main architects behind the withdrawal.
Although Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s was one of the Democratic swing votes which allowed “The Authorization” to pass through Congress in 2002 and subsequently defended the Iraq war, later statements, especially leading up to the 2008 primaries, has shown her to change tack. No statements from the State Department have indicated any resentment against either the policy or the DoD. This is natural since the main concern for the State Department is the security needed for carrying out their economic programmes, especially USAID, which is provided for by the policy. Thus, no disagreement between State and Defense Department is expected.
The Legislative Branch and Organized Interest Groups
Congress is, in article 1 sections 8 and 9, bestowed with constitutional powers to appropriate funding for the upkeep of armed forces, make laws ruling their activities and exercise power over treaties and appointments (lxxii). The House of Representatives carries greater leverage over foreign policy decisions than the Senate through their constitutional powers to appropriate funding, as the Senate’s influence has waned and is restricted to ratifying reaties with foreign governments and consenting to government appointments (lxxiii). Historically, Congress has been subject to executive encroachment on foreign policy powers; in the 1990’s Congress was consulted rather than included in decision making, with the executive circumventing legislative power through e.g. executive or congressional-executive agreements. However, through judiciary action and resolutions like the War Powers Resolution of 1973, Congress has been able to balance executive foreign policy power. The War Powers Resolution expands the War Powers Clause (art.1, sec.8, cl.11) in the Constitution by, partly in reaction to the Vietnam War, ending the legality of executive open ended foreign commitments, demanding congressional ratification within 60 days. This has some relevance for the proposed policy.
Section 4 in “The Authorization” is a direct result of this resolution, holding the President accountable for any policy shift in the region. All the legal documents presented in the above section on the executive branch are ratified by Congress, which means that Congress in essence already has approved the concept of presidentially initiated withdrawal. Congress would probably support a specific withdrawal plan as democrats fulfil their agenda and voter expectations and republicans endorse the plan based on the stance of military leaders (lxxiv). Regionally, the policy should ring home as well; foreign policy based on military power and free trade appeals to the Republican South and West and, as seen in 2.3., implementation of this policy expands the free trade area. Democrats in the North and Pacific Coast would see the policy as a step towards international power-sharing and multilateralism, which would resonate deeply in the Democrat mindset (lxxv). A withdrawal would also reduce the funds Congress would have to appropriate to the area, and although they could limit the withdrawal if they so wished through budgetary devices, this is really neither in their economic interest (with other, worthier causes to fund due to the financial crisis) nor in their political interest (with the public favouring the policy – see 2.3.) to bloc the policy. Additionally, this would be very hard, due to the assent and powers given through legal documents such as “The Authorization”. This makes the deepening synergy between interest group and Congress activity less of a threat, a synergy which might have otherwise presented a challenge to the policy as pressure from these groups necessitates foreign policy decision making in Congress (lxxvi).
Several organized interest groups would try to influence the decision making process concerning this policy, mainly the Israel Lobby (AIPAC), the Oil Lobby (API), the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and Moveon.org (although this is techically a political action committee, a PAC). The American Israel Public Affairs Committee is considered to be one of the most powerful and influential organized interest groups in the US today. Throughout the 90’s they pressured Clinton into stepping up economic sanctions against Iraq and supported containment of Iraqi military and influence (lxxvii). The Lobby supported the intervention in Iraq as they expected this to improve regional stability and the security of Israel (having been victim of Iraqi scud missiles in 1991 and of Iraqi funded Hamas and Hezbollah – see chapter 2.2. and 3.1.) . However, following the fall of Saddam and the return of relative stability to the region, and due to reassurances from then presidential candidate Obama and limited focus on Iraq in the AIPAC web pages, there is little reason to believe that the lobby will try to counteract the implementation of this policy (lxxix). The American Petroleum Institute, being a coalition of smaller organisations and 170 petroleum companies, holds implicit power by supplying one of the most important imports to the US and through its connection to both OPEC and its main currency, USD. Although largely concerned with domestic issues, the lobby will probably support the withdrawal, as this will increase oil output from Iraq and increase the free trade market (lxxx). AEI, though techically a conservative think tank, plays an important role and is notorius for its connections to Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney and private contractors like Halliburton during the Iraq war. AEI can be expected to behave much like the Oil Lobby with regard to the policy, and will probably fiercly defend US economic interests in the region (lxxxi). Moveon.org is an organization based firmly in the public outcry against the war and tries to push Congress in the direction of withdrawal through demonstrations, organized efforts in elections of representatives to Congress and through lobbying. It is identified by USA Today as one of the main federal PACs on Iraq (lxxxii). All in all, the organized interest groups will probably support this policy, although their interest following its implementation and completion might diverge.
3.3. How should this Policy be Adopted?
This policy is not a radically new one, and there has been movement towards one such policy for the duration of the Iraq war. Therefore, there is at present very little hindrance to the adoption of this policy. As discussed in previous chapters, there is a broad consensus both in the US population and the international community, Congress has long favoured withdrawal (as evident in the vetoed war-funding bill of 2007 (lxxxiii)) and much of the legislation needed is already passed. A specific practical framework for the withdrawal, at a slightly later date than stipulated in the election promise though still within the limits agreed upon in the SOFA, has been crafted by the Department of Defense, NSC and Armed Forces officials and presented by the President at his Camp Lejeune Speech (lxxxiv). Although no official documents have been released (per April 2009), the President committed the US forces to withdraw by August 2010 leaving a US residual force of 50 000 to be withdrawn by December 2011 in accordance with the SOFA.
As mentioned in chapter 3.2., Congress has in essence consented to the withdrawal through ”The Authorization” and the Iraq Liberation Act of 1997 and has endorsed the withdrawal plan in statements to this effect (lxxxv). Futhermore, Congress budgetary appropriations supports the withdrawal; funding for foreign operations in Iraq has decreased from a troop surge funding of $1.959.150.000 in FY 2007 via $956.000.000 in FY 2008 to only $397.000.000 in FY 2009 (lxxxvi). This indicates that Congress is firmly behind reducing US presense in Iraq and unwilling to finance any further involvement on the scale of previous years.
With Congressional backing and a practical framework in place there is little to hinder the adoption of this policy. However, there are a few issues which would bolster the implementation were they to be resolved. The first issue is regarding the SOFA. The “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq” is in fact an executive agreement, which means that it has been established without the normal two thirds approval of the Senate. It is at present a sole executive agreement, an agreement between the executive and a foreign administration. However, as George Will of the Washington Post Writers Group pointed out, the US-Iraq SOFA is politically more consequential than earlier SOFAs, and should therefore be ratified as a congressional-executive agreement (lxxxvii). This leaves it still short of a treaty per se, but the simple majority in Congress will solidify the agreement and close the option for Congress to withold any future legislation with regard to the policy suggested in this paper. It will also continue the cooperative atmosphere between the executive and legaslative in this issue whilst still preserving the constitutional legality of the actions of each branch (lxxxviii). Furthermore, Congress should pass legislation allowing commencement of the Iraqi-American Enterprise Fund, which was included in the budget for FY 2009, though pending Congressional action (lxxxix). This will serve domestic purposes for both USA and Iraq, as it will open for a flux of capital, technology and jobs to Iraq (xc).
Seeing as most of the legislation concerning this policy is passed, there are not many obstacles to its adoption. Both the Defense Department and the State Department would be more or less squarely behind the President, public and international opinion would favour adoption and Congress will back this, as seen in this memorandum. Although it does not constitute an obstacle to the policy’s adoption in itself, the President should let the SOFA be ratified by Congress. The previous administration’s policy towards Iraq lead to their president’s party losing majority in Congress, and the new administration needs to keep the population and Congress happy to avoid a similar scenario. A closer relationship to the legislative and congressional groups is in executive interest, particularly in terms of other, domestic and often financial policies.
The only real obstacle related to this policy concerns its completion, not its implementation, but it is the issue of regional security. There is some worry that as troop presence declines, violence escalates leaving an Iraq in turmoil. However, the estimates in this memorandum assess this to be unlikely but provides for this through the obligation of responsibility. This means that the US commits to enabling Iraqi government (and hopefully democracy) to sustain itself by providing resources and training. It also means that the withdrawal should halt or reverse should violence increase. However, it is imperative that this happens at the request of the Iraqi government and that intervention should happen multilaterally. It is, obviously, important not to repeat past mistakes. In general, obstacles to the adoption of this policy are considered to be minimal while proponents are plentiful.
Likewise, the political cost is limited. The President risks losing support mainly in the Republican South and West, and possibly among moderate Democrats. This loss is, however, minimal, in some cases based on a non-existing basis of support and heavily outweighed by the political boons, as explained in this memorandum. The SOFA was signed by lame duck President Bush, who had become inextricably linked to the war. This would indicate that not only is the political cost minimal, but it is also sound presidential policy. John Dumbrell, Professor of Government at Durham University has defined six key indicators of presidential foreign policy success, all of which may, at least partially, be achieved through this policy (xci):
- Protecting US security and international economic interests
- Avoiding manifest foreign policy disasters
- Maintenance of a domestic foreign policy consensus
- Effective procedures and skilled foreign policy management
- Clarity of purpose and vision
- Observing the requirements of domestic and international law
lii. ”The Turkish Petroleum Company” on the Countrystudies pages, last visited 7.6.2009
liii. Henry Kissinger: “Diplomacy”, New York 1994: 548
liv. ”A Tyrant 40 Years in the Making” on Global Policy Forum article Mar. 14, 2003
lvi. Ibid, ”Our History with Iraq”, talk given by Chip Gagnon at Teach-in on Iraq, Cornell University, October 22, 2002
lvii. Ibid, ”Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980-1984” in the National Securtity Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, last visited 7.4.2009
lviii. Cox and Stokes 2008: 93, Kissinger 1994: 250
lix. Cox and Stokes 2008: 92-93, 99
lx. Ibid: 96, 124
lxi. Cox and Stokes 2008: 91-101
lxii. ”Our History with Iraq”, talk given by Chip Gagnon at Teach-in on Iraq, Cornell University, October 22, 2002
lxiii. Study commissioned by the US Joint Forces Command: "Iraqi Perspectives Project", 91-95
lxiv. Cox and Stokes 2008: 119
lxv. Ibid: 97, 115, 119
lxvi. ”United States Constitution” on Library of Congress webpages, last visited 5.4.2009
lxvii. “The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002”, Oct. 2002
lxviii. “Iraq Liberation Act of 1998” (Public Law 105-338)
lxix. The US-Iraq SOFA is not mentioned here. This is not due to any legality issues, but to an unresolved issue of congressional ratification (see below the “Legislative” heading)
lxx. Anne Gearan and Pamela Hess: "Troops to leave Iraq in 18 months, officials say", Associated Press article, Feb 25, 2009 on: http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iIqTxkm4R61mhLR-6kvTK2j9_0bQD96IL5I00
lxxi. Department of Defense: "Secretary Gates Interview on Meet The Press with David Gregory", News transcript release by, Mar.1, 2009 on: http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4363
lxxii. ”United States Constitution” on Library of Congress webpages, last visited 5.4.2009
lxxiii. Ibid, C118
lxxiv. Anne Flaherty: "Consensus emerges in Congress for Obama Iraq Plan", Guardian article, Mar. 1, 2009 on: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uslatest/story/0,,-8381042,00.html
lxxv. Cox and Stokes 2008: 159
lxxvi. Ibid: 118. For more on the congressional role, see chapter 3.3.
lxxvii. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt: The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, Working Paper, on the Harvard University Web pages, Mar. 2007: 36
lxxviii. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt: The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, London 2007: 230-231
lxxix. President Obama: "Obama's Speech at the AIPAC Conference" transcript on the Council on Foreign Relations pages, last visited 6.4.2009 on: http://www.cfr.org/publication/16419/, AIPAC homepage, last visited 6.4.2009
lxxx. API homepage, last visited 6.4.2009, see also links to statistics under chapter 2.3. heading “Economy”
lxxxi. AEI homepage, last visited 6.4.2009
lxxxii. Dilanian 2008
lxxxiii. Bush vetoes war-funding bill with withdrawal timetable", CNN article, May 2, 2007
lxxxiv. President Obama: "Remarks of President Barack Obama – Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq" Speech transcript on the White House web page Feb 27, 2009
lxxxv. Flaherty 2009
lxxxvi. USAID: Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2009, 509-511
lxxxvii. George Will: "Congress Should Debate SOFA with Iraq", Real Clear Politics article, Mar. 5, 2009 on: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/03/congress_should_debate_sofa_wi.html, Definition of Treaty and Executive Agreement on the Department of State web pages, last visited 6.4.2009, "Laws and Treaties - International Agreements" on Embassy of the US Japan web pages, last visited 6.4.2009
lxxxviii. The reason for this added last phrase is recent statements from the executive concerning limitations to the President’s foreign policy capabilities in division H of H.R.1105, which were provisioned for as the bill was signed into law recently(“The Omnibus Appripriations Act, 2009”). The statement can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-from-the-President-on-the-signing-of-HR-1105/
lxxxix. USAID: Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2009, 511
xc. For more on this, see chapter 2.3. heading “Economy”
xcv. John Dumbrell in Cox and Stokes 2008: 103
- Brooks, Stephen G. and Wohlforth, William C., Hard Times for Soft Balancing on Dartmouth College's homepage, last visited 4.4.2009 on: http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govt/docs/brooks&wohlforth_05is.pdf
- Cox, Michael and Stokes, Doug: US Foreign Policy, New York 2008
- Jenkins, Philip: A History of the United States, New York, 2007
- Kissinger, Henry: Diplomacy, New York 1994
- Mearsheimer, John J. and Walt, Stephen M.: The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, London 2007
- Mearsheimer, John J. and Walt, Stephen M.: The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, Working Paper, on the Harvard University Web pages, Mar. 2007 on: http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP06-011/$File/rwp_06_011_walt.pdf
- Micklethwait, John and Woolridge, Adrian: The Right Nation, New York 2005
- Agence France-Presse: "Iraq ready for US withdrawal", Jan. 20, 2009 on: http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jLhMWjhGvv9fLd9_3Kfwu2-5ux4w
- Bennett, Brian: "America's other army", TIME article, Oct. 17, 2007 on: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1672792,00.html?iid=sphere-inline-sidebar
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- Burns, Robert "Obama considering at least 2 Iraq withdrawal plans", Guardian article, Feb. 7, 2009 on: http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-8347458,00.html?gusrc=gpd
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- Garamone, Jim: "Iraqi Military Builds Up Combat Power, Logistics", American Forces Press Service news article, Nov. 3, 2008 on: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=51768
- Gearan, Anne and Hess, Pamela: "Troops to leave Iraq in 18 months, officials say", Associated Press article, Feb 25, 2009 on: http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iIqTxkm4R61mhLR-6kvTK2j9_0bQD96IL5I00
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- USA Today: "Iraq willing to see U.S. troops leave early", Jan. 21, 2009 on: http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2009-01-21-us-troops_N.htm
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Legislation and governmental reports
(All found on governmental web pages)
- "Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq"/ US-Iraq SOFA in the White House Archives on: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/SE_SOFA.pdf
- “The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002”, Oct. 2002 on: http://www.c-span.org/resources/pdf/hjres114.pdf
- "Defense manpower center overview of death toll”, last visited Mar. 30, 2009 on: http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/OIF-Total-by-month.pdf
- H.R.1105 on the Library of Congress web pages, last visited 6.4.2009 on: http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c111:4:./temp/~c111HAt8Mp
- Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338). on: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ338.105.pdf
- The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report, June 2008 on: http://intelligence.senate.gov/080605/phase2a.pdf
- Study commissioned by the US Joint Forces Command: "Iraqi Perspectives Project" on: http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2006/ipp.pdf
- ”United States Constitution” on Library of Congress web pages, last visited 5.4.2009 on: http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/bdsdcc:@field(DOCID+@lit(bdsdccc0801))
- Rt Hon John Hutton MP: Opening speech delivered by the UK Secretary of State for Defence at a House of Commons debate on "Iraq - Future Strategic Relationship", on 14 January 2009 on: http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/SofS/20090114OpeningStatementForHouseOfCommonsDebateiraqFutureStrategicRelationship.htm
- President Obama: "Obama's Speech at the AIPAC Conference" transcript on the Council on Foreign Relations pages, last visited 6.4.2009 on: http://www.cfr.org/publication/16419/
- President Obama: "Remarks of President Barack Obama – Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq" Speech transcript on the White House web page Feb 27, 2009 on: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Responsibly-Ending-the-War-in-Iraq/
- Tessler, Mark: “Citizen Attitudes about Politics and Religion in the Arab World, invited lecture at the UCLA, 2005 on: http://cas.uchicago.edu/workshops/cpolit/papers/TesslerNSFNarrative.doc
- The Biographical Directory of the United States Congress: entry on Richard Bruce Cheney on: http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=C000344
- USAID: Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations FY2009, 509-511 on: http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2009/101368.pdf
- Department of Defense: "Secretary Gates Interview on Meet The Press with David Gregory", News transcript release by, Mar.1, 2009 on: http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4363
- House Majority Leader: communiqué on the testimony of General David Petraeus and former Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker on political progress in Iraq, last visited 4.4.2009 on: http://majorityleader.house.gov/docUploads/PetraeusCrockerHearingFewAnswersSameStrategy.pdf
- Infoplease.com: statistics of National Voter Turnout in Federal Elections: 1960–2008, last visited 4.4.2009 on: http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781453.html
- zFacts.com: graph on Oil Price and Net Oil Imports 1970-2008 on: http://zfacts.com/p/196.html
- WTRG Economics: graph on Petroleum Consumption and Price 1973-2007 on: http://www.wtrg.com/oil_graphs/USpetroleumconsumption.gif
-AIPAC homepage, last visited 6.4.2009 on: www.aipac.org
- AEI homepage, last visited 6.4.2009 on: www.aei.org
- API homepage, last visited 6.4.2009 on: www.api.org
- C-SPAN Congressional Glossary, last visited 6.4.2009 on: http://www.c-span.org/guide/congress/glossary/glossary.htm
- CNN Election Issue Overview on CNNPolitics. com, last visited 7.4.2009 on: http://edition.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/issues/issues.iraq.html
- Definition of Treaty and Executive Agreement on the Department of State web pages, last visited 6.4.2009 on: http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70133.htm
- "Iraq Body Count", an online project tracking the death toll of Iraqi civilians, last visited 23.2.1009 on: http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/
- "Laws and Treaties - International Agreements" on Embassy of the US Japan web pages, last visited 6.4.2009 on: http://aboutusa.japan.usembassy.gov/e/jusa-laws-treaties.html
- "Organizing for America", the Obama Biden Homepage, last visited 10.2.2009 on: http://www.barackobama.com/issues/iraq/
- United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, last visited 4.4.2009 on: www.uniraq.org